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Abstract 
The use of maximum entropy infer­
ence in reasoning with uncertain informa­
tion is commonly justified by an 
information-theoretic argument. This paper 
discusses a possible objection to this 
information-theoretic justification and shows 
how it can be met. I then compare max­
imum entropy inference with certain other 
currently popular methods for uncertain rea­
soning. In making such a comparison, one 
must distinguish between static and dynamic 
theories of degrees of belief: a static theory 
concerns the consistency conditions for 
degrees of belief at a given time; whereas a 
dynamic theory concerns how one's degrees 
of belief should change in. the light of new 
information. lt is argued that maximum 
entropy is a dynamic theory and that a com­
plete theory of uncertain reasoning can be 
gotten by combining maximum entropy 
inference with probability theory, which is a 
static theory. This total theory, I argue, is 
much bet�r grounded than are other 
theories of uncertain reasoning. 
1. Introduction 
Maximum relative entropy in/ erence 
(also known as cross- entropy inference or 
minimum- information updating) is a 
method for updating a probability distribu­
tion in the light of information in the form 
of new probabilities for propositions defined 
within the probability space. Where prior is 
the prior probability distribution over space 
S = x1,x2, • • . , x0 (I assume for the sake 
of simplicity that S is finite) and C is a set 
of constraints on the probabilities of subsets 
of S, maximum relative entropy inference 
tells us to choose as posterior that unique 
value of post that maximizes the relative 
entropy function 
H (post,prior) = 
, 
- l:post(x1)log (post(xi)!prior(x1)) 
l==l 
subject to the constraints given in C. The 
existence of this unique value of po8t is 
mathematically guaranteed provided C is a 
consistent set of constraints. 
The following sections explore the 
question of what justification can be given 
for thinking that maximum relative entropy 
inference is a reasonable way of updating 
probabilities. It is argued that the combina­
tion of probability theory and maximum 
relative entropy provides the best total 
approach to the problem of uncertain rea­
soning. 
2. The Information-Theoretic Juatlflcatlon 
The standard information-theoretic 
justification of maximum entropy inference 
goes as follows: when presented with infor­
mation in the form of a set of probability 
constraints, we want to infer a probability 
distribution that satisfies those constraints 
but that, of all such distributions, is the 
least biased. To be least biased is to minim­
ize the amount of information contained in 
the distribution (the distribution must have 
at least as much information content as the 
constraints since it satisfies them) . Among 
the distributions satisfying the constraints 
there is a unique one, the maximum 
entropy distribution, that has minimum 
information. Hence maximum entropy 
inference selects the right distribution. 
This argument has a great deal of 
intuitive force. However, we must be care-
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ful to be sure that its force does not depend 
upon an equivocation. The argument sounds 
plausible provided "information" is used in 
its ordinary sense: certainly when we make 
probabilistic inferences, we want to go 
beyond the given information to the smal­
lest extent possible, but we cannot do this 
by minimizing just any function and calling 
the value of that function for a given proba­
bility space the "information" in that space. 
Thus we want assurance that maximizing 
entropy does come to the same thing as 
minimizing information in its ordinary 
sense. 
Why should this even be an issue? It 
should be an issue because some leading 
information-theorists have denied that the 
standard mathematical ( or engineering) 
definition of information captures its ordi­
nary sense. For example, Hamming has 
written about the mathematical definition of 
information that: 
This is an engineering definition based 
on probabilities and is not a definition 
based on the meaning of symbols to 
the human receiver. The confusion at 
this point has been very great for out­
siders who glance at information 
theory; they fail to grasp that this is a 
highly technical definition that captures 
only part [italicized in the original 
textJ of the richness of the usual idea 
of information. 
To see how far this definition differs 
from "common sense" consider the 
question : "What book contains the 
most information?" We, of course, 
have to standardize the question by 
stating the book, page, and type-font 
sizes, as well as the variety ( alphabet) 
of type fonts to be used. Once this is 
done, the answer is clearly : "The 
book with the most information is the 
one with the type chosen completely 
and uniformly at random!" Each new 
symbol will come as a complete 
surprise . ... I4J p. 103. 
Abramson, in jlJ p.2, makes a similar 
claim. In talking about Shannon's 1948 
paper "A Mathematical Theory of Com­
munication", which initiated the field of 
information theory, he 8tates : "In terms of 
the colloquial meaning of information, 
Shannon's paper deals with the carriers of 
information--symbols--and not with infor­
mation itself. It deals with communication 
and the means of communication rather 
than that elusive end product of 
communication--information." 
Both these quotation from experts on 
information theory suggest a divergence 
between the mathematical sense of "infor­
mation" and_j_ts ordinary or colloquial sense. 
However, their reasons for thinking such a 
divergence exists are confused. To bring 
out what the confusion is, let me focus on 
Hamming's example of the information con­
tent of a book. His claim is that a book 
whose symbols occur randomly contains the 
maximum amount or information in the 
mathematical sense but such a book con­
tains mere gibberish and so conveys no 
information in the ordinary sense. 
This example is highly misleading. We 
have to keep in mind that information is 
defined relative a probability space. And 
now we must ask, "Relative to what space is 
the information of the book maximum!" 
The answer must be "Relative to the space 
whose points are occurrences of certain sym­
bols ( i.e.the symbols that make up the text) , 
where the points are equiprobable." Call 
this space B. Indeed, H(B) is maximal 
when the members of B are equiprobable. 
However, in reading a text, we are rarely 
concerned with the information it provides 
us concerning the occurrence of symbols; 
rather, we are concerned with what it tells 
us about certain non-linguistic states. By vir­
tue of linguistic conventions, there is a 
correlation between linguistic entities and 
states of the world. If the linguistic entities 
are declarative sentences and we have rea­
son to believe that those sentences are true, 
then the occurrence or certain symbols will 
give us evidence as to the existence of cer­
tain states of the world. Let W be a proba­
bility space whose events are occurrences of 
certain non-linguistic events. Then we are 
in general concerned not about B in itself 
but about the information B imparts about 
W. The information that B imparts about W 
is written "I(W;S)" --i.e. it is the increase in 
information about W that we get on learning 
which events in B obtain. Now the initial 
uncertainty concerning W is H(W) , the 
22 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
entropy of W. The uncertainty that remains 
when the truth about B is learned is H( W I 
B) , the conditional entropy of W with 
respect to B, which is defined by: 
( 1) H(WiB) =Eprob(w,b)log(1fprob(wlb)), 
where prob ( w, b) is the joint probability of 
w and b, prob ( w lb) is the conditional pro­
bability of w with respect to b, and the sum 
is over w in W and b in B. Hence the 
increase in information that occurs on learn­
ing which element of B obtains is given by: 
( 2) I( W;B) =H( W)- H( w I B). 
Substituting B for W in ( 2) , we see that the 
information gained about B itself when the 
truth about B is learned given by: 
(3) I(B;B) =H(B). 
Normally, when we say that, for example, 
one book contains more information .than 
another, we are speaking about conditional 
information, information that the books give 
us about some space other than the space of 
occurrences of sym bois in the books. So if 
W is the space of interest and B the space of 
symbol occurrences in the book, for an 
informative book I( W;B) has a high value. 
When Hamming speaks of the book whose 
symbols occur randomly as containing the 
most information, he is speaking of I(B;B), 
not I(W;B). But this is not a different sense 
of "information"; it is only a difference in 
the space about which we want information. 
Furthermore, maximizing I(B;B) may well 
be incompatible with maximizing I( W;B). 
Suppose that B is random in a strong sense: 
that each member of B is equiprobable and 
moreover that the probability of any 
member of B given an event outside of B is 
equal to the probability of that member ( i.e. 
there is nothing outside of B that would help 
us predict which member of B will occur). 
Then I(B;B) will be maximal but I( W;B) 
will be zero. 
Thus Hamming and Abramson have 
given no good reason for believing that the 
mathematical sense of "information" differs 
from its ordinary sense. What is more, a 
plausible argument can be given that the 
mathematical definition does indeed pre­
cisely capture the ordinary notion of "infor­
mation": There is a well-known mathemati­
cal result that the logarithm is the only func-
tion r that satisfies the condition that f(xy) 
= f( x) + f( y) ( together with some other 
trivial conditions such as that f is continuous 
over its domain). But our intuitive notion 
of amount of information satisfies this con­
dition. For if events E1 and E2 are 
independent, then the amount of informa­
tion gained from learning that both occur 
should be the sum of the amounts of infor­
mation gained from learning of the 
occurrence of each separately. If we assume 
that the amount of information gained is a 
function of the probability of the event, 
then the condition becomes 
I(Prob(E1 )Prob(E2)) = I(Prob(E1)) + 
I(Prob(E2)), where I denotes the informa­
tion of a given probability. Hence I( x) can 
be defined as -log( x) ( since x is in the range 
( 0, 1 J, we need to take the negative of the 
log so that I( x) will be a positive quantity) . 
Then to get the entropy of an entire proba­
bility distribution, we average over the 
entropy of each element and so arrive at the 
standard mathematical definition of entropy. 
3. The Axiomatic J ustlflcatlon 
The intuitive argument for maximum 
entropy inference still goes through, then: 
maximum entropy inference really does 
minimize information in its ordinary sense. 
Some might argue, however, that this intui­
tive argument is not needed, since the vali­
dity of maximum entropy inference has 
been axiomatically derived by Shore and 
Johnson in !6]. It is worth spending some 
time on this derivation, since it raises 
interesting epistemological issues. Shore 
and Johnson's result is a result of the type, 
"The unique function satisfying conditions 
C1, ... , Cn is function F." Results of this type 
can be important since they reduce the 
question of whether or not a specified 
mathematical function correctly represents a 
given intuitive concept to the question of 
whether or not the concept satisfies the 
stated conditions ( We showed the use of 
such a. result earlier in the argument that 
-log( pr( e)) gives the information in event 
e). However, it is not always easy to tell, in 
a non-circular fashion, whether or not the 
given concept satisfies the stated conditions. 
Shore and Johnson state four axioms that 
they take to characterize an information 
operator that takes a prior distribution and a 
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set of constraints the posterior distribution is 
to satisfy and yields a particular posterior 
distribution satisfying those constraints. 
Intuitively, we want this information opera­
tor to yield the best estimate of the posterior 
distribution in the light of the prior distribu­
tion and the information about the posterior. 
Instead of giving an explicit definition of 
this operator, Shore and Johnson character­
ize it axiomatically and prove that any 
interpretation of it that satisfies the axioms 
rn ust yield the same result as maximum 
relative entropy. 
This is a valuable result, for the rea­
sons mentioned, but it is not clear that it 
should increase our confidence that max­
imum relative inference is the correct tech­
nique for determining a posterior. For not 
all the axioms that Shore and Johnson state 
are clearly axioms that should hold of such 
an information operator. Consider, for 
example, their a.xiorn four. In this axiom 
S1, ... ,sn is a partition on space D; for each i, 
l�i�n, I1 is information about the condi­
tional density within S1; I is the conjunction 
of the I1; prob*Si is the relativization of pro­
bability distribution prob to set Si; M gives 
the probability of being in each of the S1; 
and post( p, i) denotes the result of applying 
the information operator to probability dis­
tribution p with respect to information i 
about the posterior. Axiom four reads: 
(4) post(prior,l&M)*Si =post(prior*Si,Ii). 
Consider one consequence of ( 4) when I is 
empty. If I is empty, then 
post(prior,l&M) *Si =post(prior,M) *Si and 
post(prior*Si,Ii) = prior*Si. Hence in the 
special case in which I is empty, we have 
this version of (4): 
(4 a ) post(prior,M)*Si =prior*Si. 
If A is an arbitrary subset of D, ( 4 a ) can be 
more perspicously written as: 
(4b) post(prior,M)(A lSi) =prior(A lSi). 
( 4b) says that new information about 
the probability of members of the partition 
does not affect conditional probabilities 
within members of the partition. Is this a 
reasonable condition to impose on the infor­
mation operator? Skyrrns [8J has argued 
that there are cases in which ( 4b) fails, the 
particulars of the case depending upon what 
concept of probability is in question. Sup­
pose, to use an example from Skyrrns, that 
constraint M gives the physical probability 
( propensity) of members of the partition S. 
Then M may give us information about 
events in D not available from knowing 
which member of S obtains. For example, 
if we know that the physical probability of a 
coin's corning up heads on the next flip is 
2/3, then this gives us information about 
the coin that we wouldn't have simply from 
knowing that the next flip carne up heads -­
e.g, we have reason to believe it did not 
come from the U.S. mint. Thus if we let M 
= "The physical probability of heads on the 
next flip is 2/3", H = "The coin lands 
heads on the next flip", and A = "The coin 
carne from the U.S. mint", then ( 4b) fails: 
post(prior,M)(A I H) is less than prior(A I 
H). 
Consider another case, one in which 
probability is personal probability. If A is a 
proposition about an action you will perform 
in the future and the members of S are pro­
positions about the world relevant to decid­
ing whether or not to perform the action, 
then ( 4b) would seem to fail. For the pro­
bability of your performing an action would 
depend more strongly on your personal pro­
babilities for the states of the world than on 
the states of the world themselves. As an 
example, consider the decision-theoretic 
problem of the lady and the tiger: you are to 
choose one of two doors; behind one door is 
a tiger, behind the other is a beautiful prin­
cess. If you choose the door behind which 
there is the princess, she is yours; if the 
door behind which there is a tiger, you will 
be eaten alive. Label the doors "door 1" and 
"door 2" and let T be the proposition that 
there is a tiger behind door 1. If we let D 1 
be the action of choosing door 1, then the 
probability of D 1 depends more upon the 
chooser's personal probability for T than it 
does upon the truth of T. Thus if the pro­
bability of T is initially 0.5 and the new con­
straint C is that the probability of T is 0.8 
( perhaps the chooser thinks he bears omi­
nous growling behind door 1 -- the growling 
is probably from the tiger although it's pos­
sible the princess ate something for lunch 
that dido 't agree with her). Then 
post( prior,C)(D 1 I T) should be lower than 
prior(D 1 I T), unless the chooser believes at 
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the time at which he has the prior that the 
truth of T will lead, before the moment of 
decision, to a personal probability for T 
greater than or equal to 0.8 -- but be need 
not believe this; he may expect no new 
information about what is behind the doors 
to be forthcoming. 
The above examples cast doubt on 
Shore and Johnson's axiom four. I believe 
that the supporter of maximum entropy can 
make a plausible response to these exam­
ples, but space does not permit phmging 
into this complicated debate. In any case, 
the moral I wish to draw from this debate is 
that an axiomatic justification of the sort 
Shore and Johnson give is convincing only 
to the degree that the individual axioms are 
convincing. Since Shore and Johnson's 
axiom four is not obviously true, they can­
not claim to have proven the validity of 
maximum relative entropy inference. 
Rather, I think the best argument we have 
now for maximum relative entropy infer­
ence is the intuitive information-theoretic 
one. If we think this argument sound, then 
we should also think that axiom four is true 
( since maximum relative entropy inference 
does satisfy axiom four) , but then to use 
axioms one through four to argue for max­
imum relative entropy would be circular. 
4. Other Methods of Reasoning with 
Uncertainty 
I now want to turn my attention to the 
question of how maximum entropy infer­
ence compares with other currently popular 
methods of uncertain inference. One thing 
that must be kept in mind in making such a 
comparison is that theories of uncertain 
inference generally have two components, 
one a view concerning the conditions under 
which a belief system at a particular time is 
consistent and another a view about how a 
given belief system should be changed in 
the light of new evidence. Call the first 
component the "static component" and the 
second the "dynamic component". To illus­
trate the difference between these two com­
ponents, consider the following example: I 
now believe a given die is fair; I therefore 
ass ign probability 1/6 to each of the possibil­
ities of a certain number coming up on a 
throw of the die; what probability should I 
now assign to the disjunction "Either one 
comes up or two comes up"? This is a prob­
lem addressed by the static component of a 
theory since it concerns the consistency of a 
belief system at a single time. Suppose, 
however, that I learn that the die is not fair 
and that in fact the expected value of the 
number showing on the die is 4.5. Then the 
problem of bow to revise my system of 
belief to accommodate this new information, 
is a problem addressed by the dynamic com­
ponent of the theory since it concerns how 
my belief system changes through time. 
The static component of the theory can give 
no answer to the dynamic problem : there 
will in general be many consistent belief sys­
tems compatible with the new information. 
Much confusion can result if the above 
distinction is ignored. In comparing two 
theories of reasoning with uncertainty, one 
must compare each component of one with 
the corresponding component of the other. 
To compare the static component of one 
theory with the dynamic component of the 
other only invites confusion. It seems to 
me that some commentators have fallen into 
this trap of comparing apples and oranges, 
especially when one of the theories in ques­
tion is maximum entropy. The reason for 
this is that these commentators have not 
seen clearly ... that maximum entropy is a 
dynamic, rather than a static, theory. The 
dynamic view of maximum entropy is com­
mon in the philosophical literature on the 
subject ( e.g, see [8J, [9J and the references 
therein) , but since it is apt to be controver­
sial elsewhere, let me spend some time 
defending this view of maximum entropy. 
On this view of maximum entropy 
inference, maximum relative entropy, or 
cross-entropy, is the basic notion, and what 
is known simply as "maximum entropy" is 
maximum relative entropy with respect to a 
uniform prior. Thus we always think of 
maximum relative inference as a way of 
passing from one probability distribution to 
another. In this sense maximum entropy 
inference addresses only the dynamic prob­
lem and not the static one. When max­
imum entropy inference is applied to a case 
in which there are no non-trivial constraints, 
one might think that it is being used to get a 
prior distribution and therefore to solve a 
static problem. However, if we think of 
maximum entropy as maximum relative 
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entropy with respect to a uniform prior, 
then we are already assuming a uniform 
prior, which, of course, remains uniform in 
the absence of any new constraints; regard­
ing maximum relative entropy as the basic 
notion is justified by the fact that in the con­
tinuous case, there is no straightforward way 
of generalizing the nonrelative maximum 
entropy formula for the discrete case; as 
Jaynes points out (!5J, pp.59-60 and p. 124) 
the best that can be done is to change the 
summation to an integral at the same time 
introducing an invariant measure m(x) over 
the space in question. This measure m(x) 
represents a distribution of total 
indifference--i.e. a distribution expressing 
complete ignorance; and maximum entropy 
does not provide a method for determining 
this indifference measure. 
Some of the putative rivals of max­
imum entropy inference do not challenge it 
directly because they primarily address the 
static problem. The max-min rules Cor com­
bining certainty factors in the inference sys­
tem of MYCIN j7J or for combining possi­
bilities in fuzzy logic jiOJ, for example, are 
really rivals of standard probability theory, 
not of maximum entropy. To the extent 
that these nonstandard theories address the 
dynamic component, the divergence from 
maximum entropy is often quite small. In 
the inference system of MYCIN, for exam­
ple, when the evidence is known with cer­
tainty, updating reduces to conditionalization 
on the evidence; and when the evidence is 
not certain the certainty factor of the 
hypothesis on the basis or the evidence is 
multiplied by the certainty factor of the evi­
dence to yield the final degree of belief in 
the hypothesis, which gives a rough approxi­
mation to the result of maximum entropy 
inference (the approximation is better the 
more certain the evidence is). What is dis­
tinctive about the approach to uncertainty 
implemented by the authors of MYCIN is 
not the updating, but the static rules for 
combining certainty factors. 
However, advocates of maximum 
entropy inference generally view it as part or 
a package whose static component is stan­
dard probability theory. And it is the entire 
package that should be evaluated. Peter 
Cheeseman j2J has done a much needed job 
in defending probability theory against 
current objections. Let me say some words 
in its defense also. Attempts to replace pro­
bability theory wrongly ignore the coherence 
arguments for the axioms of probability 
theory given by de Finetti and others (e.g., 
see 13] and 18]). These arguments show 
that anyone whose degrees of belief violate 
the probability axioms could have a "Dutch 
book" made against him --i.e. he could be 
presented with a series bets that he would 
have to regard as fair in light of his beliefs, 
but he would be guaranteed to lose money 
on the bets. Now the formulation in terms 
of bets is unnecessary. The formulation by 
de Finetti (13] pp.13-14) may be more 
agreeable to those averse to thinking in 
terms of gambles: the idea is to view a deci­
sion about the occurrence of events 
E1,E2, ... ,En as the specification of numbers 
z11z2, ... ,Zn such that the loss due to choos-
ing those numbers is 
L = ( v(Et)- Zt)2 + ( v(E2) - z2)2 
+ · · · + (v(Eu)- Zu)2 
where v(Ei) = 1 if Ei occurs and = 0 oth­
erwise; then define a decision D to be 
admissible if there does not exist a decision 
whose loss is always less than that of the D 
(i.e. no matter which events occur). de 
Finetti shows that if the x's are chosen so 
that the decision is admissible then they 
have to satisfy the axioms of probability -­
they must play the role of probabilities in 
the reasoning of the agent. 
This reduction of probability theory to 
decision theory is of great importance. Not 
only does it justify the axioms of probability, 
it also sheds light on the nature of probabili­
ties as used in decision problems. For the 
reduction to make sense, probabilities must 
express an agent's uncertainty about the 
facts; hence the probabilities must be rela­
tive to the agent in some sense (but not 
necessarily subjective-- as Jaynes argues 15], 
such probabilities may be objective in that 
two agents with the same state of knowledge 
should agree on probabilities). Moreover, 
there has to be a definite set of facts about 
which the agent is uncertain for the loss 
function to be well-defined. An agent's 
uncertainty about the truth of a proposition 
must be distinguished from the proposition 
itself being inherently vague. For example, 
it is one thing to be unsure about whether 
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or not Jones is tall because one is ignorant 
of Jones' height but quite another to be 
unsure of this because Jones is a borderline 
case of a tall man. The uncertainty, or 
better, vagueness, attendant to the second 
case may perhaps be appropriately analyzed 
by some version of fuzzy logic. But fuzzy 
logic is not appropriate in cases of the first 
sort. Zadeh's view seems to be that fuzzy 
logic is appropriate to cases in which the 
uncertainty is non- statistical in nature and 
does not involve the "the notion of 
repeated experimentation." ( [ lOj p. 152). If 
this means that the uncertainties cannot be 
given a frequency interpretation, then this is 
incorrect, for there are decision problems 
involving uncertainties that cannot plausibly 
be given a frequency interpretation, but 
which are really uncertainties about the 
truth of non-vague propositions. 
5. Conclusion 
Fuzzy logic and other rivals of proba­
bility theory face a formidable challenge 
from de Finetti' s decision-theoretic founda­
tion for probability theory. Moreover, since 
these non-standard theories are primarily 
static t,heories, they do not directly challenge 
maximum relative entropy inference. Hence 
in view of the strong information-theoretic 
justification for maximum relative entropy 
inference, its combination with probability 
theory appears to be the best approach to 
reasoning with uncertainty. 
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